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I. INTRODUCTION

This Comment uses the dialectical paradigm of German philosopher
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1833) to analyze the progression of
United States voting laws since the colonial foundations of a participatory
democratic process in this country. This analysis can be used to interpret past
progression of voting rights in the United States as well as a provoking way
to predict future trends in United States voting rights - as an ongoing
"progressive" political process or rhetorical method of erasing categories or
classifications and eliminating distinctions amongst persons.
First, Hegel's dialectical method is established as a major premise.
This Comment employs the language of "thesis-antithesis-synthesis" and the
dialectical method as a simplified paradigm of Hegel's complex thoughts of
"aufheben"; Michael H. Hoffheimer explains the detailed distinction between
"dialectic" and "aufheben":
Hegel himself does not use the terms "dialectic" or
"dialectical" very often. They appear only three times in the
sections on philosophy of law in the first edition of his
Encyclopedia (1817). That text refers to the dialectical
conflict among various duties -- a conflict that lacks any
resolution. It refers to "true dialectic" as constituting the
subject that knows its subordination under another. And it
terms the "justice of the world" as the representation
(darstellt) of the dialectic of spirits of particular peoples.
None of these passages apply the term "dialectic" to the
transcendental resolution of an opposition or to the move to
a new phase or level of the system.
The term Hegel employs most frequently to denote the
transcending resolution of oppositions, contradictions and
conflicts, is "autheben." Variously translated as "transcend,"
"supersede," or "sublimate," the term "autheben" is best
translated by the neologism "sublate." Unlike "dialectic," the
term "sublation" figures prominently in important transitions
in Hegel's system. It occurs twice in the first, cryptic section
of Hegel's philosophy of law from 1817:
Objective spirit is the unity of theoretical
and practical spirit. Free will for itself
appears in the form of free will now that the
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formalism, contingency, and subjectivity of
its practical activity is sublated. Through the
sublation of this mediation, spirit becomes
the unmediated self-posited particularity,
which in the form of universal is freedom
itself.
Other passages apply the term "sublation" to express the
overcoming of contradiction and to describe the resolution of
a progress in a third judgment. Unlike the term "dialectic,"
"sublation" denotes resolution of an unmediated opposition
into a higher category -- a resolution that marks the
movement to a new level of the system. Thus, Hegel applies
the term "sublation" in the 1817 philosophy of law to the
resolution or mediation of unmediated existence and
unmediated singularity. In the final appearance of the term
"sublation" in the philosophy of law, a mediated relationship
is itself overcome or resolved into the higher category of
order based on custom.
It is thus the term "sublation," not "dialectic" or "thesissynthesis-antithesis," that is linked most closely to
distinctive, transcending features of Hegel's treatment of
conflict and contradiction. Hegel did not coin the term
"aujheben." Vernacular meanings in the eighteenth century
included to pick up, to preserve, and to cancel. Commentaries
always emphasize that he used the term "sublation" with the
double meaning of both to cancel and to preserve, referring
to the reconciliation of an opposition in a manner that
somehow both cancels and preserves the opposed elements
at a higher level. But the term also had technical meanings.
In mathematics, it meant to reduce a fraction. In law, it meant
to repeal or annul a statute. Hegel was not the first to import
the term into philosophy or legal philosophy. His friend
Schelling employed the term widely throughout his early
writings, and notably in his New Deduction of Natural Law
(1796), but Schelling almost always used the term
"aufheben" in the univocal sense of "to cancel." Similarly,
some of Hegel's followers returned to this more vernacular
use of the term.'
Second, the generally accepted history of United States voting laws
from the 1770s to the current day is laid out as a minor premise.
' Michael H. Hoffheimer, Hegel's First Philosophy ofLaw, 62 TENN. L. REv. 823, 840-42 (1995)
(footnotes omitted).
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Third, the major premise of Hegel's dialectical method weaves and
applies itself to the progression of United States voting laws to explain the
progressive elimination of distinctions and categories. This third step of
application suggests possible future scenarios.
Hegel was a philosopher in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. 2 His ideas have been applied to interpret a wide range of academia
and law, including torts,' contracts,4 property,' criminal, 6 and evidence.
Professor Hoflbeimer

provides a comprehensive introduction to Hegel's publication history:
Hegel's first published work was a translation and commentary on the French letters
of Jean-Jacques Cart that were critical of Bern constitutional law. This work has not
been translated. For a discussion, see H.S. Harris, Hegel's Development: Toward
the Sunlight 1770-1801 418-34 (1972).
Hegel conceived of law as part of his system from at least 1800; it is
expressly included in many unpublished drafts of his system and is implicitly
assumed to be part of his system in incomplete drafts of his system. For writings on
law that Hegel himself did not publish and that are available in English translation,
see Hegel and the Human Spirit: A Translation of the Jena Lectures on the
Philosophy of Spirit (1805-6) with Commentary (Leo Rauch trans., 1983); Georg
W.F. Hegel, On the Recent Domestic Affairs of Wurtemberg, Especially on the
Inadequacy of the Municipal Constitution, in Hegel's Political Writings 243-245
(T.M. Knox trans., 1964); G.W.F. Hegel, System of Ethical Life (1802/3) and First
Philosophy of Spirit (H.S. Harris & T.M. Knox trans., 1979) . .. (both manuscripts
translated in this book treat law extensively); Georg W.F. Hegel, The German
Constitution, in Hegel's Political Writings, supra, at 143-242; G.W.F. Hegel, The
Philosophical Propaedeutic (Michael George & Andrew Vincent eds. & A.V. Miller
trans., 1986) .... He also treated law in his lectures on the philosophy of history.
See Georg W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History 95-101 (H.B.
Nisbet trans., 1975).
Hegel published an article in two parts on natural law in 1802 and 1803.
See G.W.F. Hegel, Natural Law (T.M. Knox trans., 1975) . . . . He included
important treatments of law in 1807 in G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit 29094 (A.V. Miller trans., 1977) ... ; G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind 50106 (J.B. Baillie trans., 1967) .... He published articles on contemporary politics
that treat laws and legal institutions at length. See Georg W.F. Hegel, Proceedings
of the Estates Assembly in Wurtemberg, 1815-16, in Hegel's Political Writings,
supra, at 246-94; Georg W.F. Hegel, The English Reform Bill, in Hegel's Political
Writings, supra, at 295-330.
Id. at 829 n.24.
' Id. at 826 n.8 (first citing Steven J. Heyman, Foundations ofthe Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REV.
673 (1994); and then citing J. Robert S. Prichard & Alan Brudner, Tort Liability for Breach of Statute: A
Natural Rights Perspective, 2 L. & PHIL. 89 (1983), for application of Hegel's concepts in torts).
4 Id. at n.9 (first citing Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive
2

Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDozo L. REV. 1077 (1989);

and then citing Michael Rosenfeld, Hegel and the Dialectics of Contract, 10 CARDozo L. REV. 1199
(1989), for application of Hegel's concepts in contracts).
s Id. at n.10 (first citing Justin Hughes, The Philosophy ofIntellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287
(1988); then citing Timothy J. Lewis, A Hegelian Theory ofNuisance Law, 48 ToRONTO FAC. L. REV. 259
(1990); then citing Michael Salter, Justifying Private Property Rights: A Message from Hegel's
Jurisprudential Writings, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 245 (1987); then citing Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle0-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REV. 239 (1994); and then
citing Jeanne L. Schroeder, Virgin Territory: Margaret Radin's Imagery of Personal Property as the

Inviolate Feminine Body, 79 MINN. L. REV. 55 (1994), for application of Hegel's concepts in property
law).
6 Id at n. 11 (citing Alan Brudner, Punishment and Violence, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1771 (1991)
for application of Hegel's concepts in criminal law).
Id at n. 12 (first citing Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach to Privileges Under Federal
Rule of Evidence 501: The Restrictive Thesis, the Expansive Antithesis, and the Contextual Synthesis, 73

NEB. L. REv. 511-44 (1994); and then citing Gregory M. Klass & Gustavo Faigenbaum, The
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II. HEGELIAN DIALECTIC
Hegel's dialectic presupposes a rational structure to political history.8
Hegel illustrates the dialectic rule by his discussion of a ruler and those who
are ruled, the "populace." 9 The rule begins with assertions by the ruler of
absolute power.'o But the ruler's exercise of that power causes resentment in
the populace, because the populace sees the ruler exercise freedom." The
ruler, sensing a threat from the populace, tries to bring them more firmly under
his control.' 2 This often begins with simple brutality to force obedience, but
there are limits to the effectiveness of force. 3
We have here, in Hegelian terms, a political thesis (the rule that the
ruler's authority is absolute) and an antithesis (resistance to the ruler's
authority). 4 At first, the ruler might try to simply suppress the antithesis by
forcibly compelling obedience." But, whether as a matter of egocentric
psychology or political strategy, the ruler's suppression merely intensifies the
popular antithesis, the resistance to the ruler's authority.16
The ruler and the populace thus move toward a synthesis." The ruler
seeks to bring the populace back under control -- in Hegel's terminology, to
inwardize them -- while the populace demands more control.'" The ruler thus

Enlightenment of Dialectics: StrategiesInvolved in Burdens of Proof, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 73558 (1994), for application of Hegel's concepts in the law of evidence).
8 Raj Bhala, Hegelian Reflections on UnilateralAction in the World Trading System, 15 BERKLEY J.
INT'L L. 159, 184 n.93 (1997) (noting that Hegel's history is the subject of much debate, but a common
formulation concludes Hegel argued a rational structure to history: "Hegel repeats this thesis in his
conclusion.... (noting that for Hegel, 'world history is not wholly an affair of chance or contingency;'
rather 'the history of the world has a rational structure,' and 'this rational structure .. . is the development
of freedom') and (stating that 'Hegel considered that the history of the human race is a development from
less to greater freedom and from less adequate forms of freedom to freedom in its perfection"') (emphasis
omitted) (citations omitted)).
' This process is often referred to as guided by the "Geist." Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Impact
of Hobbes's EmpiricalNaturalLaw on Title VII's Effectiveness: A Hegelian Critique, 25 CONN. L. REV.
607, 661 n.299 (1993) (quoting Michael A. Simon: "History for Hegel is an unfolding of the Geist or spirit
as it objectifies itself in the world. Spirit actualizes itself by making things happen, and is at the same time
conscious of itself.... History is the story of the development of human freedom; it is freedom becoming
objective, which means that the world is brought into conformity with the rational system of mind. The
system of right--that is to say, the law--represents the rational principles that determine the constraints that
operate on what free-willing existents can will at a particular moment of history" (citations omitted)).
'0 See GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 43-44 (J. Sibree trans.,

1956).
12

Id. at 44.
Id. at 96.

"Id. at 96-97.
"4 Bhala, supranote 8, at 187-88.
"s Id. at 187.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 173, 187-88.
1" This personal interpretation is drawn from part of the Absolute Knowing chapter in Phenomenology
ofSpirit, section 788:
In revealed religion self-consciousness is aware of itself in pictorial objective form,
not as yet as self-consciousness. 1t must cancel this form and become aware of itself
in all the forms it has hitherto taken up. They must not merely be forms of selfconsciousness for us, the phenomenological observers, but for self-consciousness
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responds with charters, rights, or laws, which he grants to the populace. 9 This
reaffirms the ruler's assertion that his right is absolute, while in fact giving
the populace more power.20
This synthesis itself lasts for a time, but then becomes a new thesis.2 1
This, in Hegel's view, keeps going in a spiral, as each new thesis is undercut
by a new antithesis.22 The use of the "spiral" metaphor with Hegel is
important: we are not merely going in circles; we are going in circles that
bring us closer to the ultimate purpose of history, synthesis (what Hegel calls
the "end" of history). 2 3 This is ultimately the fully equal sharing of power
among all.
III. WAYS HEGEL'S DIALECTIC HAS BEEN USED BEFORE

Hegel's dialectic has been used and disused in many ways since his

itself. It must see how it has externalized itself in various objects, and in seeing this
also cancelled the externalization. It must see all its objective forms as itself.
G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT § 788, at 589 (A.V. Miller trans., 1977).
* Hegel illustrates this point by stating:
"[W]hat is law [Gesetz] may differ in content from what is right in itself [an sich
Recht]." In his view, slavery may be legally valid and yet unjust. Law becomes more
consistent with justice insofar as law is a "realization [Verwirklichung]" of "right
[Recht]," that is, insofar as law embodies right. Hegel often plays upon the
ambiguity of the German word for right, Recht. Recht can mean right in a legal
sense, as in having the right to do something, or right as a form of justice, as in to
be in the right. Recht can also refer to law, although Hegel uses the word Gesetz as
well, which can be translated as "law" or "statute." He does not use the words

interchangeably, instead tending to use Gesetz for positive law and Recht for a
normative sense of positive law, such as justice. The two come together when Hegel
says that "actual legal relationships presuppose laws founded on right
[Rechtsgesetz] as something valid in and for itself." Gesetz is distinguishable from
Rechtgesetz in that only the latter represents positive law fully consistent with
justice. All other varieties of positive laws [Gesetze] embody lesser forms of right
[Recht].
Thom Brooks, Between NaturalLaw and Legal Positivism:Dworkin and Hegel on Legal Theory, 23 GA.

ST. U. L. REV. 513, 520-21 (2007).
20 See

FRANciS FUKUYAMA,

THE END OF HISTORY AND

THE LAST MAN

157-58

(1992)

(distinguishing a legitimate ruler from a despot in that a legitimate ruler has popular consent, which is often
given by the ruler offering rights to life and self-preservation among other rights). This sentiment is also
summarized in a recent law review article by Professor Bhala indicating that "[t]he extension of this law
[-- egalitarian religious benefits to all people --] to both ruler and subject, namely, the idea of a constraint
on a ruler other than himself, is a necessary prerequisite toward a consciousness of freedom on the part of
the subject." Bhala, supra note 8, at 185. In other words, this aspect of an egalitarian religion conferring
"rights" or religious benefits to all people is an instance of a ruler giving up a "monopoly" on religion and
having to share it with his subjects. Id at 185-86. This is a precursor to other rights. Id. at 186.
21 Bhala, supranote 8, at 188.
22 An antithesis does not necessarily imply a negative connotation, but rather an opposite state of
affairs from the thesis.
" G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right 26 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (explaining "[p]hilosophy forms a circle. It has an initial or immediate point
- for it must begin somewhere - a point which is not demonstrated and is not a result. But the starting point
of philosophy is immediately relative, for it must appear at another end-point as a result. Philosophy is a
sequence which is not suspended in mid-air; it does not begin immediately, but is rounded off within itself'
(footnote omitted)).
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writing in the early 1800s. 24 Relatively recently, Francis Fukuyama used a
version of the dialectic between a liberal-capitalistic-democracy and
communism; in 1989, he argued that the dialectic would resolve itself with a
liberal-capitalistic-democracy. 2 5 In his work, The End ofHistory and the Last
Man, Fukuyama even seems to be suggesting that Hegel's dialectic can apply
to "universal rights." 26 Fukuyama acknowledged that history is not a linear
progression towards liberal-capitalistic-democracy, but that regressions, even
long periods of regressions, occur. 2 7
Fukuyama's interpretation of the class of the liberal-capitalisticdemocratic world follows the Hegelian paradigm. 28 Essentially, Fukuyama
shows two opposite systems clashing with each other. 29 Overtime, systems
ebb and flow, much like the ruler giving rights to the populace and then taking
rights from the populace.30 Areas such as stints of communism expanded, but
24 Hofiheimer, supra note 1, at 825 n.6 ("For two centuries Hegel was either ignored or vilified by
Anglo-American legal scholars. Holmes read Hegel but used him as a foil against which to develop his
own theories. There was a general decline of interest in European philosophy with the rise of legal
positivism and realism. Moreover, conservative theorists hostile to positivism joined the attack on Hegel
for nationalistic reasons in the wake of the World War I. Although Robert S. Summers has suggested that
Lon Fuller was influenced by Hegel, Fuller never publicly acknowledged any such influence. Richard
Hyland uses the search term 'Hegel' to demonstrate the ridiculous results of computer assisted research.

Finding numerous instances where the term "Hegel" refers to an attorney, judge, or party, Hyland

concludes that 'the most frequently cited passage about Hegel in American case law' is Judge Learned
Hand's paraphrase of William James's comparison of the Internal Revenue Code with Hegel's prose."
(citations omitted)).
25 Guyora Binder, Post-TotalitarianPolitics, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1491, 1493 (1993).
26 FUKUYAMA, supra note 20, at 217,
243.
27

Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, NAT'L INTEREST, Summer 1989, at 7-18; see generally

Ari Afilalo & Dennis Patterson, Statecraft, Trade and the Order ofStates, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 725, 726 n.5
(2006) (simplifying Fukuyama's concept in relation to political science: "According to Fukuyama, the
liberal democratic model soundly beat fascism and communism because, simply put, it was a better idea.
The liberal democratic model had no problem besting the fascist ideology of expansionism and racial
superiority. In time, it defeated the Marxist ideology -- in part because the growth of a strong and expansive
middle class, resulting from (among other factors) the welfare policies of the nation-state, had radically
changed the social reality in which Marx wrote. In the end, Fukuyama argued, all good government would
be organized along the lines of the liberal democratic model, which would be applied to govern an ethnic
or otherwise discrete nation and would protect the rights of minorities" (citation omitted)).
28 Paradigm, THEINFOLIST.COM, http://www.theinfolist.com/php/SummaryGet.php?FindGo=Para
dign (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) ("Paradigm comes from Greek napdIstyla ( paradeigma ), 'pattern,
example, sample' from the verb napa&etWlep ( paradeiknurni), 'exhibit, represent, expose' and that from
naph (para), 'beside, beyond' and Sicevult (deiknumi), 'to show, to point out'). Hegelian dialectic is
in every sense a Kuhnian paradigm, applicable to many fields of dynamic social interaction.
29 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The End of History and the New World Order: The

Triumph of Capitalismand the Competition Between Liberalism and Democracy, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
277, 278 (1992) ("To understand what Francis Fukuyama means when he says that history has come to an

end, one must first understand two things about Fukuyama. First, when Fukuyama says that history is at
an end, he means history in the Hegelian or dialectic sense; that is, history as a clash of ideologies. Second,
and far more importantly, Fukuyama is a Straussian in the Allan Bloom tradition. Fukuyama's
understanding of Hegel (or more precisely, of Alexandre Koj6ve, who presented Hegel's arguments about
the end of history to the world of political science), leads him to observe that history has ended.
Fukuyama's membership in the Straussian cult causes him hopelessly to mischaracterize and misinterpret
how world history will unfold in the coming decades." (footnotes omitted)).
'o Consider the Political Anthropology of "Gregory Bateson's concept of schismogenesis, which
describes the self-amplifying process of divergence: I take an extreme position in reaction to your extreme
position, leading you to take a more extreme position, and so on. The polarization feeds on itself as nuanced
differences become disagreement, then disapproval, exasperation, and eventually hatred." Glenn Davis
Stone, Biotechnology, Schismogenesis, and the Demise of Uncertainty, 47 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 29, 30
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liberal-capitalistic-democracy ultimately took over.31
Before turning to the application of Hegelian ideas, a brief sketch of
the history of laws governing voting rights in the United States is necessary.
IV. HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Introductionand Setting:
Initially, the right to vote from England and the earliest colonial days
had connections with property.3 2 The Kings of England permitted a certain
level of self-government and voting; suffrage was limited to people with
property." An early example of the property requirement originated from the
Electors of Knights of the Shire Act of 1432 34-reenacting the 1430 Election
Act 35-which declared that a resident, not specifically an enumerated citizen,
of a county must have the worth of forty shillings or more to vote in that
county in order to prohibit:
great outrageous and excessive numbers of people, ... of
which the most part was people of small substance and of no
value, . . . pretended a voice equivalent, as to ... the most
worthy knights and esquires ... whereby manslaughter, riots,
batteries, and divisions among the gentlemen and other
people [of the counties] shall very likely arise ... .36
The law limited voting to those whom had an annual rent of at least
forty shillings.3 7 These elements essentially remained the law for four
hundred years in England until 1832.8

(2015); see also Gregory Bateson, Steps To An Ecology Of Mind: Collected Essays In Anthropology,
Psychiatry, Evolution, And Epistemology 68-69 (University of Chicago Press 1972).
31 See FUKUYAMA, supranote 20, at 289. Fukuyama's definitive thesis of his work is that the capitalist
liberal democracy paradigm is the teleological last, or end form, of political economy; meaning that
political economies have reached their end form-teleologically speaking. See id
32 See DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1
(2d ed. 2001); see also ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, at xvii (2000) (elaborating on the history of United States election
law). Although there are many fine details and profound historical policy arguments for why events
occurred, this section is a generally accepted summation of the historical events and documents that
expanded the right to vote.
" See Vivian E. Hamilton, Democratic Inclusion, Cognitive Development, and the Age of Electoral
Majority, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1447, 1455 n.26 (2012).
1
10 Hen. 6 c. 2.
3 8 Hen. 6 c. 7.
36 GEORGE CRABB, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW; OR AN ATTEMPT TO TRACE THE RISE,
PROGRESS,
AND SUCCESSIVE CHANGES, OF THE COMMON LAW; FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME

363 (First Am. ed., 1831).
37 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 165-66 (1765).

38 Cf Act to Amend the Representation of the People in England and Wales 1832, 2 Will. 4, § 45
(UK); see John A. Phillips & Charles Wetherell, The Great Reformation Act of 1832 and the Political
Modernization of England, 100 AM. HIST. REV. 411, 411-13 (1995).
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B. Situation of Voting at Founding:
During the Colonial Era many colonies, including, Virginia,
Maryland, Rhode Island, and South Carolina, passed various voting
restrictions.39 In the 1700s, Virginia passed various laws restricting voting in
the House of Burgesses to only those who met certain property
requirements.4 0 The South Carolina election law of 1716 stated, "[I]t is
necessary and reasonable, that none but such persons who have an interest in
this Province . .. be proved to be worth thirty pounds current money of this
Province, shall be deemed a person qualified to vote for ...
a member or
members of. . . this Province ... ."41
Religious restrictions also existed for a time in the colonies and had
origins in the struggles between Catholicism and Protestantism in the Mother
Country.4 2 Maryland passed a law in 1718 codifying practices present since
the 1690s that excluded Catholics from voting.4 3 Rhode Island passed a
naturalization restriction, thereby voting on Jewish adherents voting in 1719;
but, after the revolution, Rhode Island repealed this ban following the creation
of the United States." By the late 1780s, most of the religious prohibitions

" Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, The Evolution of Suffrage Institutions in the New
World, 65 J. EcoN. HIST. 891, 896-97 (2005); see for example EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN
SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 221 (1975), Harry H. Haden,

Equality - The Cornerstone of Democracy, 21 ALA. L. 269, 270 (1960), Christopher J. Peters, Outcomes,
Reasons and Equality, 80 Bos. U. L. REV. 1095, 1124 (2000), Pamela S. Karlan, John Hart Ely and the
Problem of Gerrymandering: The Lion in Winter, 114 YALE L.J. 1329, 1334 (2005), Paul K. Longmore,
"Good English Without Idiom or Tone": The Colonial Origins ofAmerican Speech, 37 J. OF INTERDISC.

HIST. 513, 513 (2007), and V.F. Nourse & Sarah A. Maguire, The Lost History of Governanceand Equal
Protection,58 DUKE L.J. 955, 955 (2009), for general treatments of the history of political power and the
origins and extensions of the franchise.
. "In Virginia, a half acre of land carried the vote until 1736, then the requirement was raised to 100
acres of wild land, twenty-five acres of improved land, or a house and lot in town. In the boroughs of
Norfolk and Williamsburg, men with £50 of property could vote, as could also anyone who had served a
five-year apprenticeship to a trade." Robert Brown, Reinterpretationof the Formationof the American
Constitution, 42 B.U.L. REV. 413, 422 (1962). See An Act for Giving Certain Powers to the Governour
and Council, andfor Punishing Those Who Shall Oppose the Execution of the Laws (1781), reprintedin
10 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST
SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, (William Waller Hening ed., 1822).
" See An Act to Keep in Violate and Preserve the Freedom of Elections, and Appoint Who Shall Be
Deemed andAdjudged CapableofChoosing or Being Chosen Members ofthe Common House ofAssembly
(1716), reprintedin THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, at 688 (Thomas Cooper ed., 1837).
42

It is hardly remembered that the famous English anti-Catholic, "Anti-Papist" holiday "Guy Fawkes'

Day" was once kept and celebrated all over the original thirteen Colonies. During the Revolution, when

George Washington's men wanted to celebrate the Fifth ofNovember by burning the Effigy ofGuy Fawkes
himself and the Pope (Fifth ofNovember also being known as "Bonfire Day" or "Pope's Day" in England),
Washington ordered to suppress the celebration on November 5, 1775, barely six months after he had taken
charge of the Continental Army. See GEORGE WASHINGTON, General Orders November 5, 1775, in
GEORGE WASHINGTON PAPERS AT THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 1741-1799: SERIES 3G, VARICK

TRANSCRIPTS 107, https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collld-mgw3&fileName-mgw3g/gwpage
001.db& recNum=107/; see also Matthew Shea, Remember, Remember, YESTER (Nov. 5, 2013),
http://yester.ly/politics/2013/11/05/guy-fawkes/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
43 DAVID W. JORDAN, FOUNDATIONS OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN MARYLAND, 1632-1715,

at 166 (1987).
4 Edward A. Hoyt, Naturalizationunder the American Colonies: Signs ofa New Community, 67 POL.

SC. Q. 248, 253, 258, 265 (1952).
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had been removed by the states. 45
Perhaps the most potent policies behind the property restrictions
came from John Locke, who argued only property owners should be allowed
to control society's governance, "i.e. the Consent of the Majority, giving it
either by themselves, or their Representatives chosen by them[,]" because
property owners in his view had the most at stake in governance of a
country.46
Furthermore, one of the founding fathers of the United States, John
Adams, wrote in a letter to James Sullivan: "very few Men, who have no
Property, have any Judgment of their own. They talk and vote as they are
directed by Some Man of Property, who has attached their Minds to his
Interest."47

Although many restrictions on voting based on property rights still
existed, religious restrictions had been removed by the late 1790s, setting the
path for Jeffersonian Democracy and the Antebellum Period. 48

C. Jeffersonian Democracy and the Antebellum Period:
After the birth of the nation by the early 1790s, the primary people
who could vote were white men with property."9 This excluded African
Americans, women, and white men without property.so The right to vote in
the United States started to expand in the 1820s, with the promise of
Jacksonian democracy for universal white male suffrage, regardless of
property ownership." In practice, this trend continued as political parties
competed for votes by expanding the right to vote. In North Carolina and
Virginia, more practical "Realpolitik" 52 reasons for universal white suffrage
were cited for uniting all whites against slave rebellions, 53 as well as economic
4s See generally PATRICK CONLEY & MATTHEW SMITH, CATHOLICISM IN RHODE ISLAND: THE
FORMATIVE ERA 9 (1976).
4 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §

140, at 362 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). "The book was notpublished, however,
until after the revolution, and it was widely read as an after-the-fact justification for the events of 1688."
Sheldon Gelman, "Life" and "Liberty": Their Original Meaning, HistoricalAntecedents, and Current

Significance in the Debate over Abortion Rights, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 585 (1994).
4 JOHN ADAMS, Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776), in FOUNDING FAMILIES:
DIGITAL EDITIONS OF THE PAPERS OF THE WINTHROPS AND THE ADAMSES (James Taylor, ed., 2007),
http://www.masshist.org/publications/apde2/view?id=ADMS-06-04-02-0091 (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
4
See KEYSSAR, supra note 32, at 29.
4
Engerman & Sokoloff, supra note 39, at 898-99; Charles A. Rees, Remarkable Evolution: The
Early ConstitutionalHistory of Maryland, 36 U. BALT. L. REV. 217, 218 (2007).

o Engerman & Sokoloff, supra note 39, at 903; see generally Cheryl 1. Harris, Whiteness as Property,
106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993) (discussing the role whiteness, as property, plays in legitimizing
expectations of racial power and control).
5' See KEYSSAR, supra note 32, at 29.
52 Realpolitik, THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (Book only ed. 2001) (defining

"Realpolitik" as "a system of politics or principles based on practical rather than moral or ideological
considerations").
" Although not directly addressing the issue of voting rights, there is no more relevant, eloquent
exposition of the relationship between slave rebellion and expanding certain rights, specifically the right
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theories - arguing that the right to vote induced more laborers to explore the
In
United States' new territory after the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.
1841, one of the most radical advancements of white suffrage occurred with
Thomas Wilson Dorr preparing a constitutional convention to wipe out
property restrictions and only require citizenship from birth. 5 This event,
known as the Dorr Rebellion, led to a new government in Rhode Island that
eliminated the property requirement to vote, and sent new waves of suffrage
throughout the country. 6 John Tyler's presidency supported this right as
well.

7

By the 1850s, all the states had removed property restrictions on

to keep and bear arms in self-defense, (which can implicitly be analogously construed as granting other
rights as well) as Justice Clarence Thomas demonstrates in his lengthy concurrence in McDonald v. City
of Chicago:
The Southern fear of slave rebellion was not unfounded. Although there were others,
two particularly notable slave uprisings heavily influenced slaveholders in the
South. In 1822, a group of free blacks and slaves led by Denmark Vesey planned a
rebellion in which they would slay their masters and flee to Haiti. The plan was
foiled, leading to the swift arrest of 130 blacks, and the execution of 37, including
Vesey. Still, slaveowners took notice--it was reportedly feared that as many as 6,600
to 9,000 slaves and free blacks were involved in the plot. A few years later, the fear
of rebellion was realized. An uprising led by Nat Turner took the lives of at least 57
whites before it was suppressed.
The fear generated by these and other rebellions led Southern legislatures
to take particularly vicious aim at the rights of free blacks and slaves to speak or to
keep and bear arms for their defense. Teaching slaves to read (even the Bible) was
a criminal offense punished severely in some States. Virginia made it a crime for a
member of an "abolition" society to enter the State and argue "that the owners of

slaves have no property in the same, or advocate or advise the abolition of slavery."
Other States prohibited the circulation of literature denying a master's right to
property in his slaves and passed laws requiring postmasters to inspect the mails in
search of such material.
Many legislatures amended their laws prohibiting slaves from carrying
firearm[s] to apply the prohibition to free blacks as well. Florida made it the "duty"
of white citizen "patrol[s] to search negro houses or other suspected places, for fire
arms." If they found any firearms, the patrols were to take the offending slave or

free black "to the nearest justice of the peace," whereupon he would be "sever[ely]
punished" by "whipping on the bare back, not exceeding thirty-nine lashes," unless
he could give a "plain and satisfactory" explanation of how he came to possess the
gun.
561 U.S. 742, 844-46 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (second and third alterations in original) (citations
omitted).
54 See JAMES SIDBURY, PLOUGHSHARES INTO SWORDS: RACE, REBELLION, AND IDENTITY IN
GABRIEL'S VIRGINIA, 1730-1810, 260-61 (1997); LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 32, at 27; Engerman
& Sokoloff, supra note 39, at 899-900.
" William T. Mayton, Direct Democracy, Federalism & the Guarantee Clause, 2 GREEN BAG 269,

275 (1999); see generallyERIK J. CHAPUT, THE PEOPLE'S MARTYR: THOMAS WILSON DORR AND His 1842
RHODE ISLAND REBELLION (2013) (explaining the story of Thomas Wilson Dorr's preparation of the
aforementioned constitutional convention).
" See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1849). However, there did seem to be "irregularities in
voting" surrounding the "Dorrite" constitution. Id. at 60; see generally 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 174-75 (2014) (conjecturing that with the "Dorrite" rebellion-

and temporary government-although Rhode Island relinquished the property restrictions, it was unclear
how steadfastly held these new rights were).
s7 OLIVER PERRY CHITWOOD, JOHN TYLER: CHAMPION OF THE OLD SOUTH 326-28 (1939).
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voting.' 8 The next decade would witness the Civil War and a greater
expansion of voting rights in its aftermath.
D. Civil War andAftermath:
As a result of the Civil War, in 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment
extended the right to vote de jure to all males, regardless of race.59 This
created the dejure promise of unprecedented numbers of newly freed black
men being granted the right to vote.o

.

Although the law expanded the right to vote, there was ajuxtaposition
in participation among certain demographics: black involvement curtailed,
while the female suffrage movement simultaneously progressed. 1
E. Jim Crow EraandFemale Suffrage:
However, the expansion of the right to vote, with the Fifteenth
Amendment and the activities of the Freedmen's Bureau, was thwarted by the
former Confederate states that enacted Jim Crow laws.62 These laws, such as
the poll tax, literacy tests, and Grandfather clauses, created complex ways to
ensure that people of color did not vote. 6 3 Thus, although there was an
expansion of the right to vote with the Fifteenth Amendment, there was a push
back with Jim Crow laws and intimidating tactics to ensure blacks did not
vote.64
In 1913, the Seventeenth Amendment was sold to the electorate as an
expansion of the people's power, but in fact it merely altered the method of
selecting senators, without expanding the electorate at all. 65 Scholars have
argued that the Seventeenth Amendment a triumph for democracy in terms of
the states maintaining their sovereignty; and, thereby a defeat for the original

" Engerman & Sokoloff, supra note 39, at 898. But, some states retained property ownership
requirements well until the second half of the twentieth century for certain "tax districts." Id. at 896-99;

see, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 631-32 (1969) (illustrating where property
requirements, regarding school district elections, were stricken as failing the strict scrutiny test for failure
to show a compelling objective and a tight, means-end fit).
5

LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 32, at 115.

6 Id.
61 See Marcia L. McCormick, The Equality Paradise: Paradoxes of the Law's Power to Advance

Equality, 13 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REv. 515, 526-33 (2007).
62 See MICHAEL PERMAN, STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY: DISFRANCHISEMENT IN THE SOUTH, 1888-1908,
at 245-60 (2001); see also MICHAEL PERMAN, PURSUIT OF UNITY: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN SOUTH 169-76 (2009); see generally MICHAEL PERMAN, THE SOUTHERN POLITICAL
TRADITION (2012).
63

See William E. Forbath, The White Court (1910-1921): A Progressive Court?, in THE UNITED

STATES SUPREME COURT: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 195 (Christopher Tomlins ed., 2005).
(A See DESMOND KING, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: BLACK AMERICANS AND THE US FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT 3-21 (1995).
65 See ANDREW P. NAPOLITANO, THEODORE AND WOODROW: How Two AMERICAN PRESIDENTS
DESTROYED CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS 75-85 (2012).
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constitutional design of a federal republic."6 The Seventeenth Amendment
was pushed by the same "Hamiltonian" (strong central government, antistates' rights) groups responsible for the Sixteenth Amendment and the
Federal Reserve (all authorized in 1913).67 But it would be anomalous to say
that the franchise was expanded by extending the right to vote for senators to
persons outside the state legislatures - those who could not otherwise vote
were not granted the right to vote. 8

'

The Seventeenth Amendment abandoned both the plan and rationale
of Federalist Nos. 62-66, especially Federalist No. 62: II-II, not merely to
allow but to mandate direct election of Senators, rather than through state
legislature elections. 69 The "sales pitch" here for ratification was that the
Seventeenth Amendment would provide greater power to the people, and thus
more power to each individual vote, per vote, but only because it provides for
popular vote.70 But today many conservative scholars debate whether the
Seventeenth Amendment actually expanded the electorate, and many scholars
want to return to the era when state legislatures voted in senators for the
United States Congress.7

'

See Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens' Song of the

Seventeenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 500, 536-37 (1997) ("Senators similarly were concerned with
enacting laws benefitting their constituents and getting re-elected. Politics, like nature, abhorred a vacuum,
so senators felt the pressure to do something, namely enact laws.231 Once senators were no longer
accountable to and constrained by state legislatures, the maximizing function for senators was unrestrained;
senators almost always found it in their own interest to procure federal legislation, even to the detriment
of state control of traditional state functions."); see also RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); THOMAS J. DILORENZO, HAMILTON'S CURSE:
How JEFFERSON'S ARCHENEMY BETRAYED THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION - AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR
AMERICANS TODAY 159 (2008).
6
See Sanford Levinson, PoliticalParty and SenatorialSuccession: A Response to Vikram Amar on
How Best to Interpretthe Seventeenth Amendment, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 713, 721 (2008).
' Zachary D. Clopton & Steven E. Art, The Meaning of the Seventeenth Amendment and a Century

ofState Defiance, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 1181, 1185 (2013); Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy,
Federalism, and the Sirens' Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 547-49 (1997);
see WALLACE W. HALL, THE HISTORY AND EFFECT OF THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT (1936); GEORGE
H. HAYNES, THE ELECTION OF SENATORS 267 (1906).
69 But see THE FEDERALIST No. 62 (James Madison). Publius was particularly overthrown by the

Seventeenth Amendment:
11. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of senators by the State
legislatures. Among the various modes which might have been devised for
constituting this branch of the government, that which has been proposed by the
convention is probably the most congenial with the public opinion. It is
recommended by the double advantage of favoring a select appointment, and of
giving to the State governments such an agency in the formation of the federal
government as must secure the authority of the former, and may form a convenient
link between the two systems.
THE FEDERALIST No. 62 (James Madison).
'o Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth
Amendment, 73 OR. L. REV. 1007, 1010 (1994) (emphasis omitted) ("Ratification of the Seventeenth
Amendment marked the end of an intense decades-long struggle. Contemporaries hailed it as a hard-earned
and much-needed triumph of 'the people' over special interests. One observer exclaimed, 'We shall find
[the Seventeenth Amendment] in complete harmony with the direction now finally taken in modern
political experience by those forces which are swiftly bringing the true sovereign elements in every

constitutional organization into a position of deserved control."' (alteration in original)).
" See Clopton & Art, supra note 68, at 1189-94.
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By contrast, since the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Nineteenth Amendment was truly the culmination of the women suffrage
movements.7 2 In 1920, two-thirds of the state legislatures passed the
Nineteenth Amendment, allowing women to vote.73 Although there have not
been many mass movements to exclude women from voting, inequalities in
the turnout of women voters still exist today, as well as social constructs
placing women as a secondary person of the household."
F. Modern Era of Voting Rights:
In 1924, Congress granted Native Americans the right to vote.75
Again there has not been a national curtailment of this right; Native
Americans have had conflicts with federal agents, such as the Wounded Knee
incident in 1973.76 Some argue that the 1924 Indian Citizenship Rights Act
only allowed Congress to legitimize the treatment of Indian tribes, and many
tribes oppose the Act itself.77
In 1961, the Twenty-third Amendment allowed citizens in the
District of Columbia to vote for the President and to have three electors in the
Electoral College, equivalent to any of the smallest states. 78 This was a step
forward for the District of Columbia, but the citizens of the District of
Columbia still do not have any competent voting representation in the House
or Senate.7 ' The residents of the national seat of government provide a
singular and unique example of a group of people, specifically the District of
Columbia, who were governed and had no say in the way they were governed,

72 See Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the

Family, 115 HARv. L. REv. 947, 968-69, 1045 (2002).
" John R. Cosgrove, Four New Arguments Against the Constitutionality of Felony
Disenfranchisement, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 157, at 190, 201 (2004) ("The Nineteenth Amendment
adopted in 1920 prohibits denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account of sex.").
7

See U.S. WOMEN IN STRUGGLE: A FEMINIST STUDIES ANTHOLOGY 42-43 (Claire Goldberg Moses

& Heidi Hartmann eds., 1995).
" See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2016).
76

'

ROBERT BURNETTE & JOHN KOSTER, THE ROAD TO WOUNDED KNEE 220-28 (1974).
Michael D. Oeser, Tribal Citizen Participationin State and National Politics: Welcome Wagon or

Trojan Horse?, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 793, 805 n.46 (2010) (quoting Chief Irving Powless of the
Onodaga Nation, who further explained this opposition: "[The Iroquois Confederacy] have never accepted
this law. We do not consider ourselves as citizens of the United States. This law is a violation of the treaties
that we signed that prove that we are sovereign. Because we are a sovereign people, the United States
cannot make us citizens of their nation against our will.. . . I have never voted in any election of the United
States, and I do not intend to vote in any coming elections. Most of our people have never voted in your
elections" (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
7
Lynne H. Rambo, The Lawyers'Role in Selecting the President:A Complete Legal History of the
2000 Election, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 105, 126 n.121 (2002) ("The Twenty-Third Amendment
provides that the District of Columbia is allotted a number of electors equal to the number of senators and
representatives it would have if it were a state, 'but in no event more than the least populous state.' U.S.

Const. amend. XXIII, [§] 1, cl. 1-2."); see Jos6 R. Coleman Ti6, Comment, Six PuertoRican Congressmen
Go to Washington, 116 YALE L.J. 1389, 1397 (2007).
" Johnny Barnes, Towards Equal Footing: Responding to the Perceived Constitutional, Legal and

PracticalImpediments to Statehoodfor the District of Columbia, 13 D.C. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2010).
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but then being granted a voice - through vote - in how they were governed.so
In 1964, the Twenty-fourth Amendment prohibited poll tax in federal
elections; this was an extremely important step allowing poor people to vote.81
However, this often excluded racial minorities, even in antebellum times, as
well as the poor in general. 82 Thus, removing the poll tax facilitated and
accelerated the enfranchisement of racial minorities (especially the expressly
disenfranchised Southern blacks) and of the entire lower economic strata of
poor people to vote without major limitation.8 3
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibited discrimination against
racial minorities to prevent them from voting and set up elaborate federal
supervisory standards, permitting reviewing courts to inquire into the implicit
purposes and resultant effects (whether intended or not). 84 This step forward
" See id at 3 n. 11 (2010) ("U.S. Const. amend. XIV provides that, 'no state shall ...
deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' Known as the 'Equal Protection Clause,'

this provision of the Constitution makes clear and true America's promise that 'all men [and women] are
created equal.' The protections of the Fourteenth Amendment were extended to the people of Washington,

D.C. in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), a companion case to the landmark school desegregation
case, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court in Sharpe relied on the Fifth
Amendment in reaching its decision regarding the District of Columbia. Sharpe, 347 U.S. at 497 (1954).").
" United Press International, 24th Amendment, Banning Poll Tax, Has Been Ratified, N.Y. TIMES,
(Jan. 24, 1964), http://www.nytimes.com/1964/01/24/24th-amendment-banning-poll-tax-has-beenratified.html? r-1 (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
82 As Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing for the U.S. Supreme Court, summarized in Harman v.
Forssenius:

The Virginia poll tax was born of a desire to disenfranchise the Negro. At the
Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1902, the sponsor of the suffrage plan of
which the poll tax was an integral part frankly expressed the purpose of the suffrage
proposal:
Discrimination! Why, that is precisely what we propose; that,
exactly, is what this Convention was elected for -- to
discriminate to the very extremity of permissible action under
the limitations of the Federal Constitution, with a view to the
elimination of every negro voter who can be gotten rid of,
legally, without materially impairing the numerical strength
of the white electorate.
The poll tax was later characterized by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals as a
device limiting "the right of suffrage to those who took sufficient interest in the
affairs of the State to qualify themselves to vote." Campbell v. Goode, 172 Va. 463,
466,2 S.E.2d 456, 457. Whether, as the State contends, the payment of the poll tax
is also a reliable indicium of continuing residence need not be decided, for even if
the poll tax has served such an evidentiary function, the confrontation of the federal
voter with a requirement that he either continue to pay the customary poll tax or file
a certificate of residence could not be sustained. For federal elections the poll tax,
regardless of the services it performs, was abolished by the Twenty-fourth
Amendment. That Amendment was also designed to absolve all requirements
impairing the right to vote in federal elections by reason of failure to pay the poll
tax. Section 24-17.2 of the Virginia Code falls within this proscription.
380 U.S. 528, 543-44 (1965) (footnotes omitted).
83

STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1969, at 57-60, 67,

131 (1976).
8 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323, 334 (1966); Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.
2612, 2628-29 (2013) (noting the changed "status quo" and new "current" circumstances and stating "But
history did not end in 1965. By the time the Act was reauthorized in 2006, there had been 40 more years
of it. In assessing the 'current need[]' for a preclearance system that treats States differently from one

another today, that history cannot be ignored. During that time, largely because of the Voting Rights Act,
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has had a lasting impact, especially for providing firm grounds for voting
rights violation litigation grounds.85 For example, Harperv. VirginiaBoard
ofElections prohibited poll tax in all U.S. elections. 86 Much like the Twentyfourth Amendment, Harperexpanded the right to vote, but resistance to the
Voting Rights Act continues."
In 1971, the Twenty-sixth Amendment gave individuals between
eighteen and twenty-one years of age the right to vote." The public demand,
or perceived need, for this amendment originated in the socio-cultural
transformations and turmoil associated with the 1.960s cultural revolution and
the Vietnam War; if soldiers were young enough to die for the country, they
should be able to vote." Surprisingly, unlike most former situations, this has
not had much backlash yet, and many elections sway on the number of young
people voting. 90
In 1973, Congress enacted the District of Columbia's Home Rule Act
of 1973 to provide for local elections and self-governance. 9 ' In 1986, the
voting tests were abolished, disparities in voter registration and turnout due to race were erased, and
African-Americans attained political office in record numbers. And yet the coverage formula that Congress
reauthorized in 2006 ignores these developments, keeping the focus on decades-old data relevant to
decades-old problems, rather than current data reflecting current needs. The Fifteenth Amendment
commands that the right to vote shall not be denied or abridged on account of race or color, and it gives
Congress the power to enforce that command. The Amendment is not designed to punish for the past; its
purpose is to ensure a better future. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 512 (2000) ('Consistent with the
design of the Constitution, the [Fifteenth] Amendment is cast in fundamental terms, terms transcending
the particular controversy which was the immediate impetus for its enactment.'). To serve that purpose,

Congress-if it is to divide the States-must identify those jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that
makes sense in light of current conditions. It cannot rely simply on the past. We made that clear in
Northwest Austin, and we make it clear again today"); see also Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 133,
141 (1976) (upholding Katzenbach and incorporating a continuity rule consistent with Katzenbach).
85

Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the PoliticalProcess: The Transformation of Voting

Rights Jurisprudence,90 MICH. L. REv. 1833, 1836 (1992).
6 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); see Michael Halley, Freedom and Equality on the Installment Plan, 108
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 76, 80 (2010).
" See generally COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS:
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM 4 (2005), http://www.eac.gov/assets

/I/AssetManager/Exhibit/o2OM. PDF (outlining steps recommended to fully implement and enforce the
Voting Rights Act, Recommendation 1.1.2).
8
Johnson v. Governor of the State of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005). For the immediate
historical backdrop and legal antecedents to the Twenty-sixth Amendment, concerning the U.S. Congress'
immediate intent to amend the Voting Rights Act to allow eighteen-year-olds to vote without a
constitutional amendment, see Justice Hugo Black's opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
8

See Michal R. Belknap, The Warren Courtand the Vietnam War: The Limits of Legal Liberalism,

33 GA. L. REV. 65, 197-98 (1998) (discussing how widespread outrage over the war ignited public and
political participation amongst millions of Americans).
9 See WENDELL W. CULTICE, YOUTH'S BATTLE FOR THE BALLOT: A HISTORY OF VOTING AGE IN
AMERICA 174 (1992).

" See Council of the D.C. v. Gray, 42 F. Supp. 3d 134, 139-40 (D.D.C. 2014) ("This continued until
1973, when Congress enacted the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental
Reorganization Act, Pub.L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973) (codified as amended at D.C. Off.Code § I201.01 etseq.), now known as the 'Home Rule Act.' PL's MSJ at 4. The Home Rule Act was a compromise,
granting 'the people of the District of Columbia an opportunity in exercising their rights once more and
yet with adequate safeguards for the Federal interest component.' Home Rule for the District Columbia,
1973-1974: Background and Legislative History of H.R. 9056, H.R. 9682, and Related Bills Culminating
in the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, at 2106 (1974).
Nevertheless, with the Home Rule Act, Congress expressed the intent to relieve itself to 'the greatest extent

2017]

HEGELIAN DIALECTICAL ANALYSIS OF U.S. VOTING LAWS

103

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), as
amended by the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act (MOVE
Act), allowed members of the military outside of the United States or on
military bases to vote.92
Unlike the Jim Crow laws and the Virginia Constitutional Convention
of 1902, all recent enactments-including the abolition of the poll tax,
abolition of literacy requirements, the District of Columbia's Home Rule Act,
the enfranchisement of the age group eighteen to twenty-one year olds, and
the rules requiring special accommodations for overseas military personnel
voters-are designed (i.e. they have the primary "thesis") to ensure greater
participation. So, who exactly would be the group to formulate and then fight
for an "Antithesis" (other than, perhaps, reactionaries who think only wealthy,
literate people with some "stake" in the system should be allowed to vote)?
The primary current restrictions on election laws include the nation's
non-uniform counting standards, as partially examined in the case Bush v.
Gore,93 the Electoral College,94 and voter ID laws." The future of the
Hegelian dialectical process of give-and-take could have implications for the
Electoral College.

possible, . . . of the burden of legislating upon essentially local District matters.' D.C. Off.Code § 1201.02(a). The grant of legislative authority to the District in the Home Rule Act is broad, id. § 1-203.02,
but Congress included several restrictions to that authority in Sections 601, 602, and 603."). Curiously, it
appears that the District of Columbia Home Rule Act has never been codified even on a preliminary basis,
so it lacks a U.S. Code Title number, and floats alone in the uncodified sea of laws even more aimlessly
than Title 26, the collection of statutes relating to internal revenue, which has never been "internally"
codified or rendered into what is sometimes called "positive law." See Jackson v. D.C. Bd. of Elections
and Ethics, 999 A.2d 89, 100, 113-14 (D.C. 2010).
92 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a) (2016).
9 531 U.S. 98, 106 (2000).
' Ever since Bush v. Gore, there has been a large question of whether or not to keep the Electoral
College, despite its allowance of non-uniform systems of elections. David Gringer, Note, Why the National
Popular Vote Plan is the Wrong Way to Abolish the Electoral College, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 187

(2008). For arguments against the Electoral College, see Rhonda D. Hooks, Comment, Has the Electoral
College Outlived Its' Stay?, 26 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 205, 205 (2001); see also R. George Wright,
ElectoralLies and the BroaderProblems of Strict Scrutiny, 64 FLA. L. REV. 759, 763 (2012); Stephen M.
Sheppard, A Case for the Electoral College andfor its Faithless Elector, 2015 Wis. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 5

(2015). Jim King, professor of political science at the University of Wyoming, advises that:
For elaboration on the arguments favoring the electoral college, see Robert M.
Hardaway, The Electoral College and the Constitution: The Case for Preserving
Federalism (1994); and Gary L. Gregg 1H, Securing Democracy: Why We Have an
Electoral College (2001). The best recent critiques are: George C. Edwards, Why
the Electoral College is Bad for America (2004); and Lawrence D. Longley andNeal
R. Peirce, The Electoral College Primer 2000 (1999).
Jim King, PresidentialSelection, 34-FEB WYo. LAw. 26, 30 (2011).
9 See Shelley de Alth, ID at the Polls: Assessing the Impact of Recent State Voter ID Laws on Voter

Turnout, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 185, 185-86 (2009) ("Proponents argue that ID laws are necessary to
prevent voter fraud and restore public confidence in elections. Opponents answer that these laws
disenfranchise the poor, minorities, and the elderly and are unnecessary because voter impersonation fraud
is rare." (footnotes omitted)); see also Abigail A. Howell, An Examination of Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board: Photo Identification Requirements Make the Fundamental Right to Vote Far From

"PicturePerfect", 55 S.D. L. REV. 325, 326 (2010).
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One current issue is many state legislatures voting in voter ID laws.96
G. Promisesat the Same Time:
The American Revolution itself was merely a political separation,
rather than a social revolution (compared, say, with France, Russia, or the
events in the United States beginning in 1861-1877), and did nothing
immediate to change the breadth or structure of the franchise, so that voting
restrictions remained essentially unchanged from 1776 into the 1790s.9 ' The
several states' voting restrictions, inherited from colonial times, slowly gave
way, starting with unique or anomalous steps such as all white males being
allowed to vote from 1791 in Vermont, and all inhabitants (including women)
for a few years under New Jersey's first constitution, to something
approaching universal suffrage through most of the next century and a half.98
Simultaneous to the voting law restrictions existed promises of
equality, as laid out in the Declaration of Independence, and the country's
goal for all men to be created equal with "inalienable" rights. 99 Indeed, each
step forward met resistance, but overall there has been a significant
progression from merely white men with property voting to, in theory, all U.S.
citizens having the right to vote. Assuming voting rights is an expression of
equality, as each ballot is worth one vote, then manifesting that right
establishes one's equality.

9

Indiana's Voter ID law was approved in Crawfordv. Marion County Election Board. 553 U.S. 181,

204 (2008). But, Texas' law faces a much more uncertain fate having been stricken down in District Court.

Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 707 (S.D. Tex. 2014), af'ldin part vacated in part, 796 F.3d 487 (5th
Cir. 2015). In 2008, the Supreme Court found in Crawford that the State of Indiana's 'evenhanded
restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself are not invidious and
satisfy [equal protection] ..... 553 U.S. at 189-90. Interest in voter integrity was both related to voter
qualifications and substantial, or actually "sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation." Id at 190. Where
exactly "sufficiently weighty" fits on the scale of rational basis, intermediate, and strict scrutiny review is
not clear, although "sufficiently weighty" sounds like "intermediate" scrutiny. The Texas litigation in
Veasey, by contrast, saw a new angle of attack, characterizing the requirement of obtaining a voter ID card
as a new and hence "unconstitutional poll tax." 71 F. Supp. 3d at 633.
9

See, e.g., Constitutional Rights Foundation, Who Voted in Early America?, 8 BILL OF RIGHTS IN

ACTION (1991), http://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-8-1-b-who-voted-in-early-america
(last visited Apr. 1, 2017); Polk County Auditor, History of Voting in the US, POLK COUNTY IOWA,
http://auditor.co.polk.ia.us/pdf/election/ voting_history.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2017; Ed Crews, Voting in
Early America, COLONIAL

WILLIAMSBURG

J.

(2007),

http://www.history.org/foundation/journal/

spring07/elections.cfin (last visited Apr. 1, 2017); Donald Ratcliffe, The Right to Vote and the Rise of
Democracy, 1787-1828, 33 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 219, 231 (2013), http://jer.pennpress.org/media
/26167/sampleArt22.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
9
See sources cited supra note 96.
* The right to vote appears never to have been included among the "inalienable" rights. See Robert
John Araujo, What is Equality? Arguing the Reality and Dispelling the Myth: An Inquiry in a Legal
Definitionfor the American Context, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 113, 114-15 (2009). For a more radical
perspective, see TOMISLAV SuNIC, AGAINST DEMOCRACY AND EQUALITY: THE EUROPEAN NEW RIGHT
(3d ed. 2012); ALAIN DE BENOIST, BEYOND HUMAN RIGHTS: DEFENDING FREEDOMS 46 (2011); Juus
EVOLA, REVOLT AGAINST THE MODERN WORLD 24 (Inner Traditions International trans. 1995) (1969).
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V. ANALYSIS
A. Summary ofArgument:

Here, Hegel's dialectical method can be used to interpret the
progression of U.S. voting rights from exclusive to inclusive. The ruler is
analogous to the powers that have the right to vote, and the populace is the
people without the right to vote. These roles shift over time and are not the
same set of people.
The thesis is white men with property exercising the right to vote.
The antithesis is the movement of the populace, other than white men with
property, to gain the right to vote. Finally, the synthesis is not yet attained.
The dejure expansion of rights to all people with the 1964 Civil Rights Act
and the 1965 Voting Rights Act were steps forward, granting grounds for
litigation on civil rights or voting rights violations. But the synthesis of equal
exercise of voting rights to be attained by all humans subject to the laws of
the country is not yet met.
B. Situation of Voting at FoundingAnalyzed through Hegelian Dialectic:
The underlying policy behind the original thesis was that only
property owners had a stake in what policies were enacted. A version of this
stake in the governance can be seen in James Otis' famous, "taxation without
representation is tyranny." 100 This meant that the colonists felt they needed
adequate representation, or at least a voice that might be heard, in the English
Parliament, as a precondition to taxation.'o' Likewise, the property owners
felt they were the only ones who needed representation, because they were
taxed on property and had much to lose, in that "[a]n unlimited power to tax
involves, necessarily, a power to destroy . . . ."102
Alternatively, the policy for expanding the right to vote was another
version of "no taxation without representation." The white men without
property, women, and African Americans felt they had a stake in the
governance because they were subject to the laws of the land. Given that they
were subject to the laws enacted by elected officials, they should have had the
'a J. L. Bell, No Taxation without Representation (Part 1), J. AM. REVOLUTION (May 21, 2013),
http://alithingsliberty.com/2013/05/no-taxation-without-representation-part-/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
.o. Cf Campbell v. Hilton Head No. I Pub. Serv. Dist., 580 S.E.2d 137, 140 (2003) ("In language of
majestic simplicity, our Constitution provides that 'The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government....' U.S. CONST. art. IV, §4. A 'republican' form of government,
as Madison suggested in Number Ten of the Federalist Papers, is 'a Government in which the scheme
of representation takes place.' In few (if any) areas of government is Madison's 'scheme of representation'

more important than it is in the area of government finance and taxation. A principal cause of our
Revolutionary War, after all, was the imposition of taxes without representation. The concept that
'taxation without representation is tyranny' was one for which a number of the Framers had put their very
lives on the line. Our Constitution was not adopted to perpetuate the evil that led us to break our ties with
the British Crown." (citation omitted)).
102 McCulloch v. Maryland, 1819 U.S. LEXIS 320, at *1, *17, *159.
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right to vote.
In concordance with the dialectic, the ruler starts off with the birth of
the nation as the white men with property, and the rest of the population is the
ruled person, which includes slaves, women, and white men without property.
In a sense, one might well say, as this Comment proposes for
purposes of Hegelian analysis, that white men with property had an absolute
monopoly on political power in the newborn country known as the United
States of America in the 1780s. At the beginning of this Comment, Hegel's
example of the ruler vs. the populace was observed. 103 The monarchy had
been dissolved on the western shores of the Atlantic into the hands and minds
of many, but the unified "sovereignty" of King George IHl (albeit acting only
by and through the power of Parliament) had been passed only to those who
could vote and so determine, form, and shape the future path of the thirteen,
at first merely, "Confederated" states. Thus, England's "ruler" passed his
power to America's "rulers," but the "rulers" were still a minority (varying
regionally 6-20% of the total population) when compared to the "ruled
population." Hegelian dialect thus, from the beginning, sets itself up as a
framework or paradigm for sociopolitical change, at the very least, and
revolution.
The exercise of this power causes resentment in the populace,
because those without the right to vote see the freedoms exercised with those
who have the right to vote. The non-voters most closely associated with white
men with property are white men without property. Other reasons exist, such
as the politicians wishing to gain the votes of newly enfranchised people by
giving them the vote.
C. Jeffersonian Democracy andAntebellum PeriodAnalyzed through
Hegelian Dialectic:
The first steps changing the voting rights dialectic occurred with
white men without property gaining the right to vote. This can be explained
by the white men with property sensing a threat from the white male populace,
trying to bring the former under more control. Initially, this began with
simple brutality to force obedience, such as Shay's Rebellion in 1786 and
1787 and the Whiskey Rebellion from 1791 to 1794; but, as Hegelian dialectic
predicts, a ruler's use of force has limited effects. 104
The thesis existed in the 1790s, and the time prior to Jacksoniandemocracy and universal white male suffrage, even though the wheels of
change were in motion. The thesis was white men with property. The
beginning of the synthesis in the United States was the movement for
"o3 See discussionsupra Section.I.
'
See CHARLENE FORTSCH, DANIEL: UNDERSTANDING THE DREAMS AND VISIONS 189 (2006).
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universal white male suffrage, based on ideas of equality for all people.
The ruler and the populace begin their movements as a synthesis. The
white men with property sought to bring the populace under control by
inwardizingthem. This can also be interpreted as the white men with property
wanting to secure their power by giving the franchise to white men without
property to gain the latest vote. The rulers began by expanding the right to
vote throughout the nation, primarily by repealing property restrictions on
voting.' 05

D. Civil War and Aftermath Analyzed through Hegelian Dialectic:
At this point, all white males, regardless of property, are the new
rulers. However, abolitionist movements and the strategy of both the Lincoln
Administration during the Civil War and the Radical Republican Congress
afterwards lead the nation to outlaw slavery, first in the Emancipation
Proclamation of January 1, 1863, and later in the Thirteenth Amendment
(ratified December, 1865).
Although the most powerful reasons for eliminating slavery were
moral and philosophical, the motivating factor for at least some politicians,
especially those operating in the South, may likely have been to gain the votes
of enfranchised African Americans. And this rush to transform society fueled
the fire at the heart of all conflicts during Reconstruction in the South: was it
appropriate to enfranchise illiterate slaves and make them politically equal to
whites? Almost immediately after the Civil War, the Radical Republicans,
the Freedmens' Bureau, and the military commands granted all men of color
the right to vote.
The conservative "gradualist" would say that this "Radical
Republican" program was irresponsible and led to corruption and unjust
oppression and that sudden and poorly planned enfranchisement of the former
slaves in the South was no better than the early nineteenth century chaotic and
corrupt New Jersey experiment in the enfranchisement of women described
above. 106
E. Jim Crow Era and Female Suffrage Analyzed through Hegelian
Dialectic:
By this time in the 1870s, history witnessed a regression in voting

in this sense, the extension of the voting franchise is a classic "race to the bottom" situation
Io5
characterized by a progressive lowering or deterioration of standards, especially (in business contexts) as
a result of the pressure of competition. Referring to competition between states to attract the most business,
without regard to quality, "ftihe race was one not of diligence but of laxity[,}" as Justice Louis Brandeis
wrote in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee. 288 U.S. 517, 559 (1933).
'" Jan Ellen Lewis, Rethinking Women's Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1807, 63 RUTGERS L. REV.
1017,1017 (2011).
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rights.' 0 7 Although by law the right to vote had expanded to all male citizens,
regardless of race, Jim Crow laws and racist activity, specifically in the former
Confederate states, created complicated or expressly discriminatory laws
designed either to inhibit or to prohibit former slaves and racial minorities
from voting.o8
In line with this Comment's argument, these historical events show
that the Hegelian dialectic did not have a linear progression from exclusive to
inclusive. Indeed, Hegel's theory predicts that a backlash will occur from the
rulers thinking that the newly gained rights of the populace threaten the rulers.
One of the main reasons so many Southerners opposed blacks from voting
was the threat it posed to white Southerners exercising control in the former
Confederate states. 109
Unfortunately, as cited throughout this paper, this reactionary
regression was reaffirmed by many state laws and the Plessy v. Ferguson
Supreme Court results-driven case, deciding that "separate but equal" was
constitutional.' 0 In effect, a "Second American Civil War" (not as bloody as
the first) was necessary after 1954, with more-or-less constant skirmishes
continuing over "bussing," as a means to integration until 1974 to "perfect"
the results of the first war and reconstruction.'
In the meantime, the Nineteenth Amendment granted women the
right to vote in 1920, further expanding the Hegelian voting rights dialectic
for another group, which happens to constitute not in any sense a minority,
but on average over 50% of the population.1 12 Native Americans were given
the right to vote in 1924, further expanding the voting rights dialectic for a
certain group of people, at least dejure.11 3

"07 New Orleans and Grant County, Louisiana, were the sites of some of the most dramatic conflict
over the corruption that arose during the Reconstruction Era - in relation to black enfranchisement. See
generally NICHOLAS LEMANN, REDEMPTION: THE LAST BATTLE OF THE CIVIL WAR (2007); PERMAN,
STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY, supra note 62. The "Battle of Liberty Place" was nothing less than a counter-

revolution to remove black, carpetbagger, and scalawag Republicans from power on September 14, 1874,
following earlier skirmishes in the countryside known as the Colfax Massacre on Easter Sunday, April 13,
1873. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 550 (First
Perennial Classics ed. 2002) (1988); see generally LEEANNA KEITH, THE COLFAX MASSACRE: THE
UNTOLD STORY OF BLACK POWER, WHITE TERROR, AND THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION (2008).

" Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 529 (1965) (deciding whether the 1902 Virginia Constitutional
Convention poll tax to inhibit votes was constitutional).
" McCormick, supra, note 61, at 526-33.
no 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
"1 See generally LLOYD ROHLER, GEORGE WALLACE: CONSERVATIVE POPULIST (2004).
112 PopulationDistribution by Gender, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/other

/state-indicator/distribution-by-gender/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
". Native Americans clearly constitute one of those "insular" and politically powerless groups in need
of special protection under the logic of United States v. Carolene Products Co. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938). See KENNETH R. PHILIP, JOHN COLLIER'S CRUSADE FOR INDIAN REFORM 1920-1954, at 113-18,

159, 164 (1977), for details on the Indian Bill of Rights, the Indian New Deal, and John Collier's role in
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (25 U.S.C. § 5101 (2016)).
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F. Modern Era Voting Rights Disputes as Hegelian Dialectic:
Over a period of struggle, the antithesis of no dejure restrictions on
voting rights seemed to be achieved with Brown v. Board of Education,
reversing the Plessy "separate but equal" decision, and the 1965 Voting
Rights Act, which guaranteed voting rights for all people.1 14
The Supreme Court decisions and legislation of the 1960s were only
parts of the "spiral" metaphor. We have not yet reached the pinnacle of voting
rights, because many restrictions still exist. Although current U.S. law is
more favorable for equal voting rights than in 1790, there is still potential for
progress.
The spiral of Hegel's dialectic occurred when a new level of thesis
arose, such as the Fifteenth Amendment, but then a reversal antithesis drew
back upon it with Jim Crow laws. Almost all of the voting rights' expansions
had some initial pullback, even if only initially.
The "spiral" metaphor with Hegel informs us that voting rights do not
merely become more or less restrictive, as if we were going in circles, but that
the spiral brings us higher to the ultimate purpose of history. Hegel calls this
the "end" of history."' This is ultimately the full, equal sharing of power
among all people. One key marker of equality is voting rights.
The total progression of U.S. voting rights dialectic is analogous to
Francis Fukuyama's dialectic for the dialectic between a liberal-capitalisticdemocracy and communism. Here, the liberal-capitalistic-democracy is the
promise of equality and the right to vote, while communism represents the
few rulers controlling the citizens without the right to vote.
G. Reasonsfor HegelianDialectic US. Voting Rights Expansion:
Although many reasons may have existed for each expansion of
voting rights, the reasons people fought for the franchise and the reasons those
gave the franchise may have been different. The politicians may have been
giving the franchise to gain more political support for the favor of granting
the right to vote. This is what the rulers in Hegel's Philosophy of History
did. 16
On the other hand, those fighting for the right to vote arguably were
not trying to support the current politicians expanding the right to vote, but
"4 Hegelian Dialectic has almost, but not quite, achieved a world where the franchise extends to "all

inhabitants," as envisioned by the New Jersey Constitution of 1776. See N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. IV. But,
children, incarcerated prisoners, mentally incompetent people, and illegal aliens (in most states), are still
denied the right to vote. The results of most elections would seem to call into question whether the ban on
mentally incompetent voters has any positive effect or not, but that is, perhaps, a subject for a different
article.
".. See discussion supraSection.II.
"6 See discussion supraSection.H.
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rather were trying to gain equal footing in having a say in the laws they were
subject to under the elected officials.
The people originally subject to these voting restrictions over time
realized the externality of a promise of equality. This promise of equality, as
exhibited by the ability to vote, becomes more apparent as each step of voting
occurs.
In the 1820s, when all white men - regardless of property - could
vote, it became more apparent to women and African Americans (especially
freed slaves) the magnitude of this right. The people and citizens of the U.S.
desired to inwardize, in Hegelian terms, these promises of equality as
exhibited by voting rights.
VI. PREDICTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The Hegelian dialectic can be used to explain the progression of
United States' voting rights from exclusive to more inclusive. Ultimately, the
dialectic sits in the larger dialectic of history, rationally moving towards a
more democratic system of government.
Several points can be predicted for the future. First, given that history
has moved towards a more democratic and equal society over time, it likely
will continue to strive towards more equality in regards to voting rights and
expanding the electorate. As a counter argument, it would seem that just
because events have always gone a certain way, does not mean they will

continue to do so." 7
Indeed, to support this counter argument, a speech by Abraham
Lincoln in 1858, where he suggests slavery would have died out had the
cotton gin not been invented."' Lincoln says that some people in the 1850s
were saying "all men are created equal," and, at the time, it was interpreted as
just white men." 9 Lincoln points out that the economic progress due to the
cotton gin made slavery more profitable than ever; thus, more people in the
1850s likely interpreted "all men are created equal" to mean just white men
than those in the 1770s - among them, the founding fathers.' 20 However, to
distinguish this counter argument, the dialectic does not describe a linear
progression in history, but rather incorporates backward and forward
movements, hence the spiral metaphor.
Second, the voting rights dialectic examined in this Article is likely
" See generally I DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE: BEING AN ATTEMPT TO
INTRODUCE THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD OF REASONING INTO MORAL SUBJECTS 423-38 (Longmans,

Green, and Co. ed. 1878) (1739-1740).
"' See Abraham Lincoln, "House Divided" Speech at Springfield, Illinois, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN:
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1832-1858, at 426-27 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).
n1
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part of a greater dialectic, not merely starting in 1776, and is analogous to
Francis Fukuyama's dialectic comparing liberal-democratic-economic
systems to communist systems.
Third, it would seem that the dialectical method can be applied to
many scenarios and Hegel's method can be applied to a wide variety of areas
of law. Indeed, since the 1980s, there has been a surge of Hegelian analysis
applied to areas, from criminal, property, torts, employment, evidence, and
contracts.1 21

Problems in the voting system still need to be resolved, such as
deciding what a uniform election in concordance with the equal protection
clause is, as brought up in Bush v. Gore.122 Additionally, courts will likely
have to firmly decide whether the Electoral College system is consistent with
the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause.1 23
VII. CONCLUSION
Hegelian analysis of the laws governing the right to vote in the United
States suggests greater inclusivity of voters within election law. If Hegel's
premises are accepted as true, then it is reasonable to assume that this
inclusivity will continue.

"' Hoffheimer, supra note 1, at 825-27 (explaining the various applications of Hegelian analysis:
"Perhaps overcompensating for years of neglect, the past decade has witnessed an outpouring of legal

scholarship on Hegel. Hegel's ideas and methods have been applied to contemporary issues in torts,
contracts, property, criminal law, evidence, and employment law. His ideas have influenced new
theoretical approaches to law, and scholars have offered Hegelian explanations of historical problems like
the origins and nature of slavery" (footnotes omitted)).
122 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000) (discussing the uniformity ofelections in regards to the equal protection
clause as follows: "The right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation of the franchise. Equal

protection applies as well to the manner of its exercise. Having once granted the right to vote on equal
terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of

another. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665, 16 L. Ed. 2d 169, 86 S. Ct. 1079
(1966) ('Once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment'). it must be remembered that 'the right of

suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as
by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.' Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555, 12 L. Ed.
2d 506, 84 S. Ct. 1362 (1964)").
13 Id. at 104. (explaining the system of state legislatures setting up an Electoral College is overall
different in each state: "The individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the
President of the United States unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the
means to implement its power to appoint members of the Electoral College. U.S. Const., Art. 1l, § 1. This
is the source for the statement in McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35, 36 L. Ed. 869, 13 S. Ct. 3 (1892),
that the State legislature's power to select the manner for appointing electors is plenary; it may, if it so

chooses, select the electors itself, which indeed was the manner used by State legislatures in several States
for many years after the Framing of our Constitution" (citation omitted)).

